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PREFACE 
Historians have written many volumes studying the Allied Occupa,-
tion of Japan.. In-depth. studies of political, educational, and. agrarian 
refo:nns have greatly contributed to the search for a better under-
standing of post-war Japan. 
However, there has been no substantial study of the role played 
by the Imperial Ir;i.stitution during the occupation. Many American 
officials of the day maintain that no policy was more successful than 
that concerning the Emperor. The purpose of this thesis will be to 
determine the reasons the Emperor institution was not abolished, and 
what purpose the institution served under the occupation. Another 
purpose of this study will be to examine the changes in the Imperial 
Institution in post-war Japan. 
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr, Sidney D. Brown who 
served as my adviser and channeled lilf interests in East Asian Studies. 
Dr., Odie B. Faulk as a reader and critic o:f this thesis made numerous 
suggestions which improved my literary style. Finally, to my parents, 
Mr. and Mrs, Forrest Roberson, I wish to make a special dedication 
of gratitude for all the love they have given to me. 
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THE .AMERICAN DECISION TO PE~IT THE RETENTION 
OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR SYSTEM AFTER 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
On July 14, 194~ the United States and its allies in the Pacific 
War accepted the Japanese peace offer with conditions attached, 1 The 
Japanese Government stated it was ready to surrender on the basis of 
the tenns enumerated by the Potsdam Declaration of July 21:,, 1945, with 
the understanding that "the said declaration does not comprise any 
demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign 
Ruler. 112 When the un:ited States accepted this stipulation it deviated 
substantially from the announced principle of unconditional surrender. 
But in fact, American policy had not been firmly established, 
the events leading up to and during the Potsdam Conference facilitated 
slight policy modifications. The Allied policy fonnulators, especially 
those of the United States, had argued several months before Potsdam 
to "soften" the terms of surrender and the future role of the Japanese 
Emperor. Although the latter was never included within the Potsdam 
111Instrument of Surrender," Department of State, Executive Agree-
ment Series (Washington n.c.: United States Government Print.ing 
Office, October, 1929-November, 1945)., V. 2. 
2r.etter from the SWiss Charge' d' Affairs ad interim to the 
Secretary of State, August 10, 1945. The Department 2f State Bulletin 
(Washington D. c.: United States Government Printing Office, July, 
1939-April, 1971), XIX, 205. 
1 
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Declaration, the United States officials had decided they could accept 
Japanese surrender with the proviso of retaining the Japanese Imperial 
Institution. 
The general public of the Allied nations favored the abolition 
of the institution. Mass rallies were held across the U. s. Many 
mobs burned Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito in effigye Before Pots-
dam, American policy was to demand publicly that the future of the 
Imperial Institution be placed in the hands of the victorious allies. 
But officials within the government had such widely divergent opinions 
that no definite policy could be fixed. As early as 1943, the future 
role of the Japanese Emperor occupied the mind of the Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull. Advisors in favor of abolishing the institution 
argued that the Emperor as an institution was undemocratic. On the 
other hand, those who favored a more moderate policy constantly brought 
forth points centering around the idea of retaining the institution and 
using it to legitimatize occupation policye The allies could use 
Shintoism and the Imperial Institution for peace in the same manner 
the militarists used them for Waro 3 The problem was that no one could 
speculate intelligently on the effects any remark made concerning the 
Emperor might have.4 
The most ardent proponent of,this moderate policy was Joseph Grew, 
former American Ambassador to Japan.; Grew' s position, although he 
often claimed to be misunderstood both inside of and outside of 
3Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era,! Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 
ede Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1413. 
4cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1948), II, 159L -
government circles, was that the allies should at least keep an open 
mind toward the question of the Emperor's future role. 5 He expressed 
his reasoning in a paper written to Cordell Hull in April 1944, en-
titled "Post-War Plarming Committee.II The military government, he 
said, would need the help of trained Japanese civil leaders in order 
to occupy Japan successfully and in order to avoid chaos. Grew be-
lieved the Emperor to be liberal in the ideological sense, and felt 
that the Imperial Institution could be utilized for this purpose. 6 
Secretary of State Hull, while not completely convinced the 
Emperor would assent to occupation objectives, was somewhat swayed by 
Grew' s arguments. In communications during the spring of l 9Lil+ between 
the. State, War, and Navy departments and President Roosevelt, Hull 
recommended the Emperor be retained provided he lost most of his 
political power. But all three departments agreed there shouJ,d not 
be any public statement either for retention or abolition of the 
institution} 
There apparently were two main reasons why they recommended 
silence, By the end of 1944, the al.lies believed they were assured 
of victory. They had won in North Africa and had driven the Axis out 
of France. The Russians were pushing through the East European 
countries. Italy had surrendered!> Germany doubtless would soon fall. 
Stalin was giving assurances that the Spviet Union would enter the 
pacific War soon after German surrender, whereupon all the military 
5uo s. Department of State, Nominations, Hearings, Committee ,2!! 
Foreign Relations, 78-th Congress, 2nd. session, 1944, 17-19. 
6 Grew, Turbulent ~, 1411. 
7Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1593. _.....,. - ~
3 
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powers of the Allies could be turned against a badly crippled Japan. 
The Pacific War was going well for the United States. The battles of 
Midway, Guadalcanal, Guam, and Saipan had been victories for the 
Americans. Japan's defeat was virtually assured. 
Second, the United States policy makers could not be certain how 
the Japanese would react to any remark about the Emperor. Any attack 
upon the Imperial Institution would be playing into the hands of 
Japanese military leaders. The military could use the attack to 
strengthen the Japanese peoples' fighting spirit, thereby stifling 
the actions of the Japanese peace party. This could not be allowed to 
happen because it was known through an intelligence report submitted 
to Dr. Ladislas Farago, who was doing research on and planning the 
use of psychological weapons against Japan, that the Emperor himself 
was sympathetic to a group of influential people desirous of obtaining 
peace under the best possible terms. 8 If a statement favorable toward 
the Emperor was issued, the Japanese military would only tighten its 
controls on the government and possibly purge the peace advocates 
from the government. Therefore American officials believed the United 
States should not nor could not compromise the surrender terms. 
But while the United States was publicly standing on the policy 
of unconditional surrender, privately there were signs the administra~ 
tion was considering a more conciliatory plan. In December 1944, 
there was a significant gain for the moderate group when Grew was 
appointed Under Secretary of State. In such a powerful position, Grew 
would have a stronger voice in decision making. Also, Secretary of the 
8Ellis Zacharias, Secret· Missions: The Story £! ~ Int.elligence 
Officer (New York: G. P. Putman Son, 194~ 335. 
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Navy James Forrestal. had been having apprehensions about Russo-American 
postwar relations. As early as May of 1944 he had been envisioning 
Japan as the counterweight to Russia in the Far East.9 On May.l, 1945, 
at a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Grew, 
Forrestal, and the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, proposed to Presi-
dent Truman that he explain that unconditional. surrender did not mean 
the total. destruction of Japan. Grew argued that in no better way 
could the President accomplish this purpose than to assure the Japanese 
that the Japanese Imperial Institution was not being threatened.10 
President Truman agreed such a statement was desirable, but he felt it 
would be better to stress that Japan's surrender would be military. 
He was not yet convinced any promises pertaining to the Emperor were 
desirable or necessary.11 All agreed the ideal. time to deliver the 
message would be soon after Germany's surrender. 
The surrender message given by Truman on May 8, did stress that 
the Allies were demanding an unconditional. surrender of al.l Japanese 
military forces. A Japanese surrender meant neither the destruction 
of Japan, nor the enslavement of the people. But it is significant 
that there was no notice of any conditions as to the Emperor. Truman 
had followed through with his rejection of Grew's idea, 
9wa1.ter Millis, ed., The Forrestal. Diaries (New York: . The Viking 
Press, 1951), 53. ~ 
10Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: . ~ Atomic Bomb and the End of the 
War in the Pacific (Princeton, New Jersey: Prin~oiiljniversity~ress~ 
1961), lb. 
11Truman' s statement of May eighth stressed the idea of military 
surrender because he hoped the Japanese would see the difference be-
tween defeating the Japanese military and defeating the Japanese nation. 
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It is apparent the policy had been somewhat revised. There was an 
important difference between the unconditional surrender of Japan's 
military and Japan's surrender as a nation. The military of Japan 
would try to continue to fight, but perhaps the civil 1,eaders would be 
able to judge the significance of the statemento 
But while the Emperor statement was not forthcoming, the adminis-
tration continued to treat the Emperor issue as being important o Evi-
dence of this is the implementation of Operation Plan 1-45 in May, 
1945. It was a psychological phase of the war included in the paper 
written by Ellis Zacharias, a naval intelligence officer, entitled, 
"A Strategic Plan to Effect the Occupation of Japan." Zacharias 
believed that history proved that the Japanese could easily be psycho-
logically defeatedo He proposed to broadcast to the Japanese people 
attacks upon the Japanese military leaders in hopes of swaying the 
public opinion and thus getting the Japanese peace party into power.12 
The paper was submitted to and approved by Forrestal.13 Zacharias 
first broadcast on May 8, emphasized that "I am speaking only of 
Japan's military defeat." Though his broadcasts lasted until the 
end of the war, he never made any reference to the Emperor. This was 
the plan Zacharias had recommended and the policy the administration 
had decided to follow.14 
Following the German surrender the United States began "feeling 
12zacharias, Secret Missions, 336. 
13Ibid., 335. 
14The government did not publicly recognize Zacharias as its 
spokesman. But he did receive orders from the Navy Department. How 
much influence the broadcasts had on the Japanese is hard to determine. 
In the sources used in this paper, only Kase's Journey to the Missouri 
contains any mention of Zacharias. · - -
7 
out" the other allies. The administration was interested in their 
opinions about the future of the Japanese Imperial Institution. During 
the month of May, Harry Hopkins had been meeting with Stalin to dis-
cuss the future relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. At the third of such meetings, Hopkins asked Stalin his 
feelings toward the Imperial Institution. Stal:i,n said he had no real 
animosity toward Hirohito, but he felt the institution should be 
abolished. He feared Hirohito might someday be succeeded by an 
"energetic and vigorous figure who could cause trouble,."15 Ideology 
also entered into Stalin's answer. Communists are opposed to a class 
society where certain people have special privileges and perogatives. 
Certainly any society with a nobility would be a class society for the 
justification for imperial institutions rests upon the principle of 
one individual ranking above another because of his inherited position 
within society. Thus an imperial institution would be a symbol of a 
class society. 
The advocates of the moderate line knew that they would still have 
to push onward if their ideas were to be accepted as policy. Such men 
as Grew believed their recommendations could bring a speedy end to the 
Pacific war. 
On the same day Hopkins posed the Emperor question to Stalin, 
Grew met with President Truman. He still hoped the President might 
make a statement allowing constitutional monarchy in post-war. Japan. 
The President told him he was thinking along the same lines but he 
l5u. s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers,~ Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 
I, 44, Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Potsdam, I. 
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asked Grew to consult first with the military.16 
Stimson, Forrestal, General Marshall, who was head of the Army 
Chiefs of Staff, and Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, 
met in Grew's office the following dayo Grew re.ad the statement he was 
going to submit to the President. Only Davis raised an objection to 
the statement. But the nub of the matter was when should the President 
make the declaration. Grew favored immediate announcement. If it was 
issued at once, it would coincide with the air raids on Japan and would 
tend to strengthen the hands of the peace minded officials.17 General 
Marshall failed to see any need for immediate action. He felt the 
present was a bit premature. The battle of Okinawa was- still con-
tinuing and any such statement might be construed as a sign of allied 
18 weakness. The group voted to wait a while longer before announcing 
any new policy. 
This decision was supported in a memorandum written by Secretary 
of State Edward Stettinius who was attending the United Nations Confer-
ence in San Francisco. Stettinius had been kept up to date on the 
proceedings by Grew. He advised the Pr_esident to wait until 
after he had talked with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at 
Potsdam. Stettinius went on to propose that the statement could be 
turned into a three or four power demand.19 
16 
Grew, Turbulent~' 1423; Harry s. 
Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York: 
1955), 416. 
l7 Grew, Turbulent §.!:!, 1421. 
18Toid., 1424. 
l9Feis, Japan Subdued, 21.. 
Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, 
Doubleday and Company, 
Evidently the President supported his Secretary of State. When 
Grew submitted his report to President Truman, the President told him 
that he liked the idea but he had decided to hold it up until he had 
discussed the matter at the Big Three Conference. He asked Grew to 
have the subject entered on the agenda for the meeting. 20 
Entering Grew's statement on the Potsdam agenda did not settle 
the issuee During the latter part of June the Emperor statement dis-
cussions continued. The basic question of when the President should 
issue the declaration remained. When Grew, Stimson, and the Under 
Secretary of the Navy, Artemus L. Gates met in a State-War-Navy Com-
mittee meeting on Jt!lle 20, the Secretary of War read a memorandum he 
had prepared for President Truman. Stimson believed the Allies had to 
use the Emperor to obtain surrender, and the atomic bomb would be the 
21 
instrument the Emperor could use to bring about peace. All those 
present agreed any clarifying statement of unconditional surrender 
should be made prior to the invasion of Japan, perhaps after the 
Potsdam Conference would be a good time. By then, President Truman 
would know when the Soviet Union intended to enter the war against 
Japan. Also the atomic bomb tests in New Mexico would be going on. 
h •t t• 22 Any significant reports about the tests would alter t e si ua ion. 
On the second of July, Stimson carried to the White House a 
proclamation composed by the State-War-Navy subcommittee. Stimson 
20rruman, Year of Decisions, 417; Grew, Turbulent Era, 1437. --... . ....- . . . -
21Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, Qg Active Service .!£. Peace 
~ War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 631. 
2~illis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 71; Truman, ~ 2f 
Decisions , 417. 
9 
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added to it his own memorandum. These were to be included in the 
President's Briefing Book for use at Potsdam. The subcommittee recom-
mended that the Emperor's powers should be immediately suspended and he 
should be placed in protective custody. 23 As an instrument of sur-
render, the Emperor could proclaim unconditional. surrender and command 
a cessation of hostilities. He should sign and seal the unconditional 
surrender; he should command all civil and military officials to 
remain at their posts and to carry out all orders of the designated 
commander of Japan until the designated commander relieved them of 
their offices.24 The State Department went on to recommend that the 
Allied authorities refrain from any action which might imply to the 
Japanese that the Emperor was any higher than any other temporal. ruler, 
or that he was divine. 25 Also included within the memorandum was an 
"Enclosure 2" which suggested. that a constitutional monarchy could be 
acceptable if the Japanese could assure the Allies that no future 
policies would include militarism. 26 Thus, the State-War-Navy Coordi-
nating Committee had gone on record advising President Truman of the 
distinct possibility that the Emperor could be needed to obtain both 
Japanese surrender and to enforce Allied occupation. 
But Grew continued to try to convince more governmental office 
holders. The Secretary of State's Staff Committee meeting on the 
seventh .. of July erupted into a heated debate over the Emperor question. 
23FRUS, Potsdam, I, 895-897• 
24rbid .. , 886. 
25Toid. , am. 
26Ibid.,· 893. 
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The Under Secretary of State repeated his now well known arguments. 
He concluq.ed by saying he only wished the Allies to wait until after 
the Japanese surrender before passing any judgment concerning the worth 
of the Imperial Institution. To abolish the Emperor, he argued, meant 
facing a guerrilla war with the Japanese and such a situation could not 
be handled in a manner that would foster the completion of Allied 
policies. Grew went on to say it was his belief that the Emperor 
statement would not modify but would clarify unconditional surrendero 27 
Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish argued in opposition to Grew. 
MacLeish said Gennan institutions had been abolished and the Allies 
were in control of the situation there. 28 Acheson backed MacLeish 
by arguing that the Emperor was a weak leader who continually yielded 
to military pressure and could not be relied upono 29 The meeting 
adjourned without any decision being reached. 
The military, on the other hand, managed to reach an agreement. 
On the sixteenth of July at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, General 
George Marshall and Admiral William Leahy submitted a resolution 
adopting the SWNCC memorandum that had been taken to Potsdam. Their 
only stipulation was the third paragraph be changed from acceptance of 
a Japanese constitutional monarchy to allowing of the Japanese people 
to choose their own government. The other members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff adopted the resolution. Admiral Leahy sent the resolution 
in memorandum fonn to President Truman, who was already at Potsdam. 
27Ib "d 
]. . ' 901. 
28Ibid. 
29Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; ~ Years in the State 
Department (New York: w. w. Norton & Company, Inc., 19b9), 112. 
In addition to the resolution, Leahy expressed his own opinion that 
nothing should be said or done that would hamper the utilization of 
the Emperor for the future.JO 
If many of the policy formulators were under the impression that 
either President Truman alone, or the Big Three as a group would 
decide to announce a statement favorable to the Emperor, they must 
have been both surprised and disappointed to learn there was no 
reference to the Emperor during the formal Big Three meetings. Nor 
was there any mention of him in the ensuing declaration. 
Upon close examination of the events centering around Potsdam, 
one can ascertain why discussion about the Emperor was absent. 
At the time he became Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes had 
12 
not been convinced the Emperor system should be retained. The Assis-
tant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish, knowing Byrnes was 
undecided on the matter, wrote a memorandum to him saying that in his 
opinion a statement as yet, a decision in fact, was too premature. 
MacLeish went on to express grave doubts about keeping the Emperor. 31 
Byrnes was also receiving advice from former Secretary of State 
Hull. On the fifteenth of July Byrnes telephoned the former Secretary 
of State inquiring his opinion on the matter. Hull told him he f•vored 
the keeping of the Emperor but only if he and the members of "the 
ruling class were stripped of all extraordinary privilegeso" 
The following day Hull sent a cable to Byrnes explicating his 
viewso Paragraph three in allowing the Imperial System to stand might 
30 FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1269, 
3111Archibald MacLeish to Secretary of State James Byrnes," 
Ibid. , 895-897. 
13 
create serious differences if issued now. 32 Would it not be better 
to await the climax of allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war? 
If the statement was made before then, perhaps the Japanese leaders 
might see it as a sign of allied weakness. 33 
These two communications either had a deciding effect upon 
Byrnes or at least fortified his own prior view. On July seventeenth, 
two days after hearing from MacLeish and one day after receiving 
Hull's cable, Byrnes telegraphed Hull that the declaration should not 
contain any promise of Imperial retention; and also that issuance of 
the declaration should be postponed.34 
There was a second reason why the statement was never incorporated 
within the Potsdam Declaration. The United States realized that the 
Allies could bring to bear a trenendous amount of pressure upon Japan. 
Several events occurred during Potsdam which the United States inter-
preted to mean that Japan was ready to surrender. 
On the 15th of July, the same day Byrnes received·MacLeish's 
letter, the American delegation to Potsdam received word of the 
Japanese peace feelers which had begun in earnest on July 11.35 The 
Japanese were trying to get the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for 
discussions which hopefully would lead to·a negotiated peace. The 
Emperor himself wanted to send an envoy to the Kremlin to talk about 
32The word "now" was underlined in Hull's cabl.e. 
33Hu11, Memoirs, 1.594. 
34rbid. 
35James K. Byrnes, ill In~ Lifetime (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1958), 286. 
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the issues of peace.36 
Knowing this, plus the fact that Russia would not act as a media-
tor but instead intended to declare war on Japan, the Americans esti-
mated that the Japanese leadership would be hard pressed to carry on 
with the war and should be anxious to surrender. 
Then, on July 16, the same day Byrnes received Hull's cable, Presi-
dent Truman and the Secretary of State received the news of the 
successful atomic bomb explosion in New Mexico. From the information 
given in both cables, the Americans, through induction, saw Japan as~ a 
beaten nation soori unwilling to continue the'· war; while the United States 
was ready to finish the war and was capable of using the most powerful 
weapon man had yet devised. Japan was already absorbing tremendous 
punishment from the B-29 fire bomb raids. The President and Byrnes 
agreed that once the Japanese were made aware of the destructive po-
tential of the atomic bomb, they surely would be willing to lay down 
their anns. 37 
With the combination of all these factors, Americans took the 
attitude that there was no reason to make any concilitory statement. 
Besides, no one could be sure just how the Japanese might react to a 
statement about the Emperor. If the concession was made, the military 
might purge the peace seeking advisors of the Emperor, and no one 
wanted to place the Emperor's advisors in such a precarious position. 
But if the statement denounced the Emperor, the allies would be playing 
into the hands of the military. So from the American point of view, 
36rhe Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambas-
sador in the Soviet Union. FR.US, Potsdam, I; 876. 
37Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 286. 
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while there were more complications involved, the basic situation which 
existed in December 1944, had not changed. 
On July 17, when Stimson asked Byrnes about the statement, Byrnes 
told him about the decision and talked to a "schedule." The schedule 
possibly related to the announcement of the Potsdam Declaration to be 
followed by the Russian entry into the war and the dropping of the 
atomic bomb. 38 Stimson gathered that the plan had been approved by 
Truman so he did not press the matter furthero 
But one should not assume that the question of the Emperor's 
future status did not arise during Potsdam. In Berlin the discussion 
continued in the meetings of the lower echelons. The American and 
British military staffs at Potsdam began reaching a certain under-
standing on Emperor policy. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke asked the 
Americans if any consideration had been given to explaining uncon-
ditional surrender to the Japanese. He was told that certain ideas, 
such as allowing retention of the Emperor had been discussed on a 
political leveL Brooke agreed a statement retaining the Emperor was 
a good idea, especially if it were announced after the Russians entered 
the war. Brooke promised to take it up with Churchill. The American 
military advisors answered that they would be glad to have the Prime 
Minister talk over the matter with the President.39 
But the subject was discussed between Churchill and Truman only 
in private talks, and even then, only in a round-about fashion. 
Churchill felt the Japanese should be given some assurance that their 
38Feis, Japan Subdued, 64. 
39 6 FRUS, Potsdam, II, 3 -370 
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national existence was not in danger. But he wanted it understood 
that "I was only advisinge" The United States had been virtually alone 
in her fight with Japan, so he was willing to leave the final decision 
40 up to Truman. 
The final decision of course was the Potsdam Declaration. It 
followed the general lines of Stimson's July second memorandum except 
for any reference to the Emperor.41 There are only three sections 
which could possibly be construed to pertain to the Emperor, two of 
which could be inferred as "anti-retentiono" Section Six explains that 
all those who led Japan into war would be punished. 42 Section Ten 
tells the Japanese they must eliminate all obstacles to the reviving 
of democracy. 43 The Japanese could have felt that these two sections 
could mean the end of the Imperial Institutions 
However, the declaration went on to demand the unconditional 
surrender of the Japanese military. The significance of the differ-
entiation between military and national surrender has already been 
discussede But when viewed in this light one can also see within this 
statement a guarantee that Japan would be allowed to maintain her 
national existence. By including this final statement in the declara-
tion instead of taking a stand one way or the other on the Emperor 
40Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy 
(Boston: Houghton MifflinCo., 1953), 642-o -
41James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947), 206. 
42aaymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds;;,,,"~·~f American. For-
. ~ ~lations (Prinqeton:. Princeton. University Press, 19b2), VIII, .. Jo]7 '• 
' . . . ·4:~:~11';"\)I'\'· . " ; , 
43Ibid., 106. 
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question, the Allies left latitude enough for accepting the "condition" 
if need be. But certainly they hoped the July 26th declaration would 
suffice to clear the way for peace. But they were wrong; the declara-
tion was not enough. 
The Japanese received the Potsdam Declaration with apprehension. 
Togo Shigenori, the Japanese Foreign Minister did see that the Potsdam 
Declaration was a modification44 and the Foreign Office expressed the 
belief that the declaration was a statement of conditions Japan should 
accept. It was hoped that the Government would release the full text 
to the people.45 
The military was opposed to any consideration of the Potsdam 
Declaration as a surrender instrument. The omission of the Emperor 
from the declaration was looked upon as a threat to the institution. 
They wanted to seek further the prospects of a negotiated peace. The 
military's peace conditions included not only retention of the Emperor 
but also the assurance that the Allies would not invade the mainland, 
that the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from the surrounding 
countries would be gradual and at Japan's own initiative, and that 
Japan would punish her own war criminals. 46 Probably it was the 
military's hold on the Japanese Government that influenced Premier 
Kantaro Suzuki into announcing that the government was ignoring the 
44Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko 
and Ben Bruce Blakeney~ew York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 311. 
45Toid., 3og and Robert Butow, Japan's Decision .:!:£. Surrender 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, ~954), 142. 
4~amoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny; MY Str~gle for Peace, 
trans. Oswald White, ed. Major General FoS.G. Piggott rqew York: 
E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 195g), 361. 
declaration. While much has been made of the "Mokusatsu Incident, 11 47 
the fact remains that the absence of any mention of the Emperor in 
the Declaration posed a serious problem for the peace advocates, as 
retention of the Emperor was one of their requirements for peace, and 
forced the Japanese Government to appease the military or be branded 
a traitor. 48 
But if the Potsdam Declaration alone could not bring peace, the 
Allied Forces still had Byrnes' "schedule" conceived at Potsdam. On 
the sixth of August, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and on 
the seventh of August Molotov read to Sato the Russian declaration of 
18 
war. Nagasaki was hit by the bomb on the ninth of August, the same day 
Russian troops marched into Manchuria.49 
That afternoon the Japanese Supreme Council met to discuss the 
possibility of surrender. The military remained staunchly opposed to 
surrender and the only point the council could unanimously agree upon 
was the necessity of a condition that would assure the preservation 
of the national polity, the Imperial Institutione50 Joining the 
military in opposition was Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, President of the 
47Kazuo Kawai, "Mokusatsu, Japan's Answer to the Potsdam Declara-
tion," The Pacific Historical Review, XIX (November, 1950), 409-414. 
48Robert J. c. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1954), 1400 
49The Japanese Government was still waiting for the Soviet reply 
to the proposed peace talks when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. 
Ibid., 149. 
50Shigemitsu, Japan ~ ~ Destiny, 362; and Kato Masuo, The 12§.i 
War: ! Japanese Reporter's Inside Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1946), 235. Both say Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai actually 
was willing to surrender. 
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Privy Council, and War Minister Korechika Anami.5l 
After the stalemate within the Supreme Council, Marquis Koichi 
Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Premier Suzuki realized the 
only chance for peace was to get an audience with the Emperor so he 
could express his wish for peace. Kido and Suzuki met with the Emperor 
that afternoon and told him of the failure or· the Supreme Council to 
reach a decision and that it would be necessary to meet in an Imperial 
Council in order to reach a decisiono The Emperor informed them that 
I 52 h t• he was ready to issue an mperial Order to surrendero Te mee ing 
of the Imperial Council was called for that night. It was at this 
meeting that the Emperor expressed his desire to terminate the war. 53 
It was decided that only the 'Imperial Prerogative' stipulation would 
be asked.54 If the United States would accept the condition then the 
Emperor's position as the head of the Japanese state would not be 
placed in danger by surrender. The Emperor's wish was considered a 
command the Japanese leaders could not ignore. The result was the 
Japanese offer to surrendero It was sent through the Swiss Government 
on the tenth of Augusto The Japanese were ready to surrender under the 
terms of the Potsdam Declaration if their provision was acceptable. 55 
President Truman, upon receiving the message, called Byrnes, 
5~utow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 161. 
52shigemitsu, Japan and~ Destiny, 360. 
53Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 176. 
54shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 36L 
55Letter from the Swiss Charge' d' Affairs ad interim to the 
Secretary of State, August 10, 19450 The Department of~ Bulletin, 
XIX, 205. 
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Stimson, and Admiral Leahy to meet with him and to discuss the offer. 
Byrnes did not want to accept the surrender. He felt that Japan was 
surrendering to the terms of unconditional surrender. To accept this 
proposal was to accept a condition which Japan had no right to request. 
Besides Great Britain and Russia might balk at allowing the Emperor to 
. 56 remaJ.n. 
Stimson of course was willing to accept the peace offer. He had 
been disappointed that there had been no statement at Potsdam. He was 
later told that unfortunately during the war high American officials 
had made some fairly blunt statements about the Emperor. President 
Truman and secretary of State Byrnes had not thought it wise at that 
time for the government to reverse its field too sharply.57 But he had 
continued to believe that the Allies would need the Emperor to bring 
peace and to enforce occupation.58 
Admiral Leahy had been persuaded in the Combined Staff meetings, 
held during the last few months of the war, to accept the retention 
of the Emperor. 59 He said at the meeting that he had no feeling 
concerning "little Hirohito" but he did believe the Emperor as an 
institution would be needed to effect the surrender. 60 
56Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 305; and Truman, ~ £! Decisions, 
428. ---
57stimson and Bundy, O~ Active Service in Peace and War, 626. 
Research of newspapers ancf'journals does no:r-bare this out. 
58Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 305; and Truman, Year of Decisions, 
428. ----. --· 
59Admiral William Leahy, I. Was There: The Personal Stor:¥ of the 
Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and 
DiariesMade at the Time (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950),~ -
60Toid., 434; and Truman, ~ £!'. Decisions, 428. 
President Truman ordered Byrnes to write the reply to the Japanese 
offer, It was approved by all at the meeting. The condition was ac-
cepted on the basis that the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Forces. The Emperor and the Japanese High 
Command were required to sign the surrender document and to carry out 
the terms of the Potsdam Declaratione The Emperor was to order all 
military forces to cease fighting and to accept the surrender terms. 
The ultimate form of Japan's government had to be in accordance 
with the Potsdam Declaration and founded upon the freely expressed will 
61 of the Japanese people. Copies were sent to the other Allied Powers 
to get their consent. All of them approved the answer, so Byrnes sent 
the Allied reply. 
The Second World War ended with the Allies accepting the Emperor 
proposal. Grew and his colleagues had forced the American administra-
tors to keep their options open. They were able to persuade the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chief of Staff to 
issue advice to the President in favor of keeping the Emperor. Reten-
tion of the Emperor was not a decision reached prior to the morning of 
August 10, 1945. The moderate line was adopted as an alternate policy 
if the public· poli.cy of, tlie Unit'E:hflStites which was not enough to force a 
Japanese surrendere Three times a clarifying statement was almost 
announced; before May 29, 1945, before Potsdam, and after Potsdam. 
But President Truman felt he should not announce any concilitory 
remark toward the Emperor because of public opinion and because he felt 
61r.etter from the Secretary of State to the Charge' d' Affairs ad 
interim of Switzerland, August 11, 1945. The Department of State 
Bulletin, XIII, 205; and "The Instrument of Surrender" Department of 
State Executive Agreement Series 493, 2. 
obligated to President Roosevelt's policyo Also Byrnes' 'schedule' 
seemed to be enough to bring peace. The atomic bomb and the Soviet 
62 Union's entry into the war was enough to force Japan to surrender. 
As to the question that the war could have been ended sooner if 
22 
the Allies had issued the Emperor statement, one cannot easily discount 
Grew's opinion that the pro-Emperor statement would aid the Japanese 
peace advocates. However, one must note the military control of the 
Japanese Government. Certainly, the military was not ready to surren-
der until ordered by the Emperor.. Even when the Emperor finally 
ordered surrender, military elements in Tokyo rebelled and tried to 
head-off the surrender by an attempted kidnapping of the Emperor. As 
the well-informed Japanese diplomat Kase observed, these military 
revolts indicated that, "if we had attempted it (surrender) sooner, I 
rt · · t uld h d d · f 0 63 am ce am i wo ave en e ma iascoo 11 From this evidence, 
the author does not feel a concilitory statement toward the Emperor 
would have hastened the end of the war. 
62Togo stresses the fear of the atomic bomb as the reason for 
surrendero Togo, The ~ of Japan, 315. 
63Toshikazu Kase, Journey~ the Missouri (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950), 264 .. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RELATION OF THE JAPANESE Flll>EIDR 'IO SCAP POLICY 
Japan's history took a radical turn under the AJ,.lied Occupation. 
The refonns of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers found acceptance 
because of the decision to use the existing Japanese governmental insti-
tutions and historical practiceso For SCAP might be viewed as the 
twentieth century shogunate, with General MacArthur as the Shogun gov-
erning through a military organization which worked outside of but in 
coordination with the existing Japanese governmental machinery to imple-
ment policy. This is how the Imperial Institution was used so effective-
ly. Thus, retention of the Emperor was in part agreed upon as an occu-
pational expediency. Historically, the Emperor had played the role of 
the sacred legitimizer and the Allied Powers followed the Japanese 
custom, to the letter by using the Emperor to obtain acceptance for the 
innovative programs and. to purge the Emperor's advisors who had "niisledll 
the Emperor.1 
The question of how to use the Emperor during the occupation was 
being studied in the spring of 1944. In May of that year, the State-
War-N"avy Coordinating Committee sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt 
stating that if Japan was allowed to retain the Emperor, the occupation 
forces should: 1) pennit the Emperor only such functions as related to 
administrative 
1N.arquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was indicted and 
convicted of being a war criminal. 
assignments by the military governor; 2) not act so as to give the 
impression of imperial divinity or superiority; 3) not encourage nor 
2 
discourage public revolt against the Emperor. These recommendations 
were incorporated into the surrender terms by explaining that "the 
authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state 
shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who 
will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of 
surrender. n 3 Thus, the military of the conquering Allies was to be the 
true government of Japan. SCAP could voice approval or disapproval of 
the actions of the Japanese leaderso Policies of the Japanese govern-
ment could be vetoed by the occupation government and new policies 
originating at SCAP could be substituted. 
Allied Policy was formulated around the guide lines outlined in 
three basic documents, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy 
for Japan," "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Sµpreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of 
Japan," and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." Only the 
first two were of any real importance because the last of these docu-
ments was written by the Far Eastern Commission in June 1947 after most 
of the outlined policies had already been implementated. The only 
difference between "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan" and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" was the wording 
and even this was the same in ninety per cent of the documentso The 
2cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1948), · 1591-1593. -
3u. s. Department of State, Executive Agreement Series, "Instrument 
of Surrender," V (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1945) I 2a, • 
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first of the two main documents was prepared jointly by States, Navy, 
and War Coordinating Committee and sent to General MacArthur by radio 
on August twenty .... ninth. It was approved by· President Truman on the 
sixth of September and sent by messenger to SCAP the same day. It was 
basically a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after 
surrender. "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive" was written 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the State, War, Navy 
Coordinating Committee. It was sent to General MacArthur on the third 
of November and it defined the powers of SCAP and his prospective 
policies.4 The relations with Japan, it said, did not rest on a con-
tractual basis, but on unconditional surrender. The authority of SGAP 
was supreme, and it was his duty to see that the terms of the Potsdam 
Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender were carried out in good 
faith. 5 
The relation of the Emperor to SCAP was also prescribed on this 
basis. His authority was at all times to be subject to the Supreme 
Conunander. The General was to work through the Imperial Institution, 
but he could act separately if the Emperor proved not to be in support 
of the United States objectives.6 The Supreme Conunander was to require 
4supreme Conunander for the Allied Powers, Political. Reorientation 
£! Japan, {Wa;$l?:ingt,<:>:r ~~'.!'~~:i u ..oSi···~~tmt.. Printi~.·.'.:Q~-~~~);1.~It~f"~~--429. ·.···.··. ·.·· .. · . . ·. --
5".A.uthority of General MacArthur as Supreme Conunander for The 
Allied Powers," Political Reorientation of Japan, (Washington,· D.G. ~ .. 
· U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), II,. 427. 
6!m.s. Initial. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," Ibid., II, 423; 
and Raymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds. Documents in American 
Foreign Policz, VIII, '(P.rlnceton: .. ,P,:r&nee£on:.U.i;rlve.rsit.y"'P:rese, ~ : .. , ,·,,...; ; 
1962), 2687; and "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," ~. Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, XVII, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1947), 217. 
26 
the Emperor to take all necessary steps to assure that all SCAP direc-
tives were complied with by all Japanese and to see to it that all 
laws, decrees, and regulations which might conflict with the terms 
of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender were abro-
gated.? This relationship was explained to Messrs. Katsuo Okazaki, 
Morie Yukawa, and General Torashiro Kawabe at the Manila Surrender 
Conference where the Japanese delegates received a copy of the 
Instrument of Surrender and General Order Number One, which directed 
the Emperor to order the cessation of all Japanese armed resistance. 8 
When Higashi-Kuni reported to the Emperor on August the thirty-
first, "the Emperor was quite relieved" 9 over the lack of real 
severity of the terms. The Tenno had already done more than the 
general order required, Amaterasu's direct descendant was in the 
process of assuring Japanese surrender by his dignified acceptance of 
that surrender. He certainly had been themost instrumental figure in 
bringing complete surrender. 
Dr. Hiroshi Shimomura, President of the Board of Information, 
Kido, and the Emperor met on the fifteenth of August and decided that 
the quickest way to convince the people that Japan was surrendering 
was by an imperial broadcast. That morning in the Household Ministry, 
the Emperor recorded his surrender speech. The record was to be played 
7nu.s. Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP," Political 
Reorientation of Jap), (Wc1-sh:ington D&C.: , U.S.Governtnent 
Printing Office, 1950 , Il, .430. 
811General Order No. 1, Military and Naval," Ibid., 442; and 
Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan ~ ~ Destiny, ~ Struggle for Peace (New 
York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inco, 1958), 370. 
9General Staff, Reports of General MacArthur, (Was?ington D .. C.:,,, ,, 
U.S. Government Printing Office), I, ,,230 
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over NH K, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation.10 
The broadcasting of the record was essential. Even after the 
Emperor ordered surrender before the Imperial Council, the radical 
elements of the military reveled in hope of preventing the people from 
hearing the decision. Major Hatanaka led a group of soldiers to the 
palace to prevent the broadcast of the surrender record. War Minister 
Anami appeared to be ready to launch a coup d'etat and to place the 
Emperor under "the protection" of the armye However, it was learned 
that he had tried to get his subordinates to carry out the Emperor's 
wishes but they had refusede 11 The last flyers of the "Divine Wind 
Squadrons" flew over the Capital "making threatening gestures" and 
showering Tokyo with leaflets proclaiming this to be Armageddon and 
telling the people not to believe the Imperial Rescripte12 But all 
these sabotage attempts were in vaine The Imperial Rescript ordering 
the cessation of hostilities and requesting the Japanese Imperial 
Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign the 
Instrument of Surrender on behalf of the Emperor was broadcast on the 
second of September.13 
The Emperor utilized the Imperial Family as agents for surrender 
to insure the pe~le that it was his wish that the war come to an end. 
He sent members of the family to visit military posts to convince the 
101ester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That 
Ended in Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 301. 
11shigemitsu, Japan~ Her Destiny, 365. 
12.__ . 
·-ibid., 368; and Kato Masuo, The Lost War: 
Inside Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 
A. Japanese Reporter's 
248. 
l3SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 416s 
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military. He appointed Prince Higashi-Kuni to the Prime Ministry and 
Prince Konoye to the post of Deputy Prime Minister. It was their duty 
to form the cabinet that would surrender. Shigemitsu, at this time 
Foreign Minister, and Chief of the General Staff Umezu were appointed 
to the demeaning task of leading the surrender delegation. The 
Emperor himself went before the Diet to inform his people that pre-
serving the national polity meant carrying out to the letter the Allied 
demands. 
The Allies' terms for the surrender were somewhat vague because 
they wanted flexibility in their programs. But this obscureness caused 
misunderstanding. The news that Japan would be occupied by a military 
government shocked the Japanese officials who had interpreted sur-
render in a different mannere But at Yokohama on the third of Septem-
ber, Shigemitsu said he persuaded MacArthur to use the existing Japan-
ese government.14 But there is little evidence that he deserved too 
much credit. The occupation policy formulators had already made that 
decision before Shigemitsu was capable of advising MacArthur. The 
Supreme Commander knew that neither would it suffice to ~a change 
of life for the Japanese, nor force revision through military pressure. 
The adaption of Japan to democracy had to come through the existing 
Japanese institutions if the Allied policies were to endure. However, 
he was determined that SCAP was always to remain above these institu-
tions. Almost immediately upon arrival in Japan, General MacArthur was 
advised to summon the Emperor. The Supreme Commander refused, feeling 
such a move would make a martyr of the Emperor and would infuriate· the 
14shigemitsu, Japan!!!!!~ Destiny, 376. 
people. He knew that in due time the Emperor would have to come to 
him of his own accord.15 The Japanese mountain would have to go to 
the American Mohammed. 
But if MacArthur wanted to bring the "god" down from the clouds, 
many of the Allies and people in the United States wished to drag him 
in the dirt. The Allies had used the Emperor to carry out the 
surrender terms and now that he had served this purpose, such countries 
as Russia, China, and Australia wished to see him degraded further by 
being indicted as a war criminal. The United States had realized this 
and had encouraged it, though perhaps unintentionally, by its policy. 
The Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender left the door 
open for internal changes in Japan and Allied policy continued to 
guarantee freedom of choice by telling the Japanese people that they 
could do away with the Imperial Institution by popular referendum. 
This promise was not retracted following the peace settlement. 
Both the 11United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" 
and the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" stated emphatically 
that "the policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, 
not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the 
Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal 
and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. 1116 
l5u.s. Adjutant-General Office, ,a ~ Progress Report .£!;_ the 
Political Reorientation £f. Japan, October 10...,;December 31, 1.2l±2. (Wash-
ington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 36; and Courtney · 
Whitney, MacArthur: His Reridezvous With History (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1956), 285.- --
l6"U.S., Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," Political Reori-
entation 2£ )apan, II, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1950 , 423; and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 
Part II, Allied Authority," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XVII, 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing OITice, 1947), 21'/. 
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General MacArthur had no authority to interfere with internal p0litical 
problems unless occupation safety was imperiled, and even then, he 
could not act without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.17 
In the United States much sentiment toward doing away with the 
Imperial Institution existed. "Victory rallies" during the war had 
depicted Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito as common enemies of the 
Allied Powers.18 A private citizen, Ralph P. Boas of Norton, Massa-
chusetts, wrote to the New~ Times demanding that the Emperor not 
only be deposed but banished from Asia.19 This was a,typical private 
citizen's opinion. 
Many public figures were expressing the same sentiment. Admiral 
William F. Halsey, Commander of the United States Navy's Third Fleet, 
commented that "there should be no Mikado when this thing ( the war) 
is over.1120 R.ear Admiral Thomas Lo Gotch, Judge Advocate General of 
the N1:1.vy, predicted a bloody Japanese R.evolution against the Emperor. 21 
Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia sent a telegram to President 
Truman protesting that the Potsdam Declaration had been too lenient on 
22 
the Japanese and was a compromise on unconditional tenns. The 
Senator later demanded that Hirohito be tried, and introduced a 
l7Theodore McNelly, "Political R.efonn in Japan: A SCAP Report," 
Far Eastern Survey, XXI, (·September 13, 1950), 162. 
18At one such r~y in Union City, New Jersey, Hirohito was burned 
in effegy. Wl'!ir. York Times November 2, 1942, 2. __ .......... ___ 
l9Ibid., August 16, 1944, 16. 
20Toid., February 20, 1945, 2. 
21:i:bid~, July 26, 1945, 2. 
22Ibid~, September 19, 1945, 2. 
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resolution to that effect to the Senateo 23 The National Lawyers Guild 
asked President Truman to reverse war crimes policy and to indict Hiro-
hito;24 and an organization called Americans United for World Organiza-
tion, Incorporated, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Byrnes de-
manding the same fate. 25 Even Joseph Grew had admitted that if the 
invasion of Japan had been necessary perhaps the Emperor should have 
26 
been charged. 
The allies of the United States were no less adamant in demanding 
the trial of the Emperor and the abolition of the Imperial Institution. 
A Chinese newspaper, The World Daily News, asked for the death of the 
Emperor as the number one war criminalo 27 C.H. Fan, spkesman for 
China at the World Trade Union Conference asked that Hirohito be 
t . d 28 rie o 
The Russians, because of their ideology and their aggravation at 
not having more power in the occupation, were especially demanding in 
their cry to bring the Mikado to trial. Early in February of 1949, 
the Soviet Union proposed that the Emperor and five of Japan's top 
generals be tried on charges of biological warfare. 29 Later, articles 
23Toid. 
24rbido, October 2, 1945, 8. 
25Ibido, August 16, 1945, 4. 
26Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era:· ,! Diplomatic Record of Forty~, 
1904-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Coo, 1952), 1438. 
27New ~ Times, May 7, 1945, 3. 
28Ibid., February 13, 1945, 2. 
29Robert Fearey, The Occupation 2f Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950 
(New York~ Macmillan Company, 1950), 195. 
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appeared in such newspapers as the: Cominform Journal in Bucharest in 
January of 1950 ~din Pravda just two days later depicting the Emperor 
as a diabolical murde:rer}0 In February of 1950, Panyushkin, the Soviet 
ambassador in Washington, proposed that the Emperor be tried on charges 
of "crimes against humanity."3l 
The Soviet Union was trying to cripple Japan to such an extent 
that she could not rival Soviet aims irl the Far East which included 
the control of Manchuria and the Sakhalin Islands. The Russians were 
also demanding vast sums of reparations which would almost totally 
destroy Japan's industrial capacity. These demands also involved the 
growing rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The 
Russians soon learned after the war that the United States was going 
to control the occupation of Japan. That America might become "soft" 
on occupation terms and even help rebuild Japan in order to curb Russian 
influence in the Far East was a constant fear of the Soviet Union. She 
thus felt the need to take the lead against the questionable American 
occupation policies. 
The countries of Southeast Asia were not far behind the .Russians 
in supporting trial of the Emperor. They too had learned to fear the 
Japanese. They wanted to insure that Japan would be rid of all 
elements of military aggression. Thus, Australia and New Zealand sub-
mitted a joint list of those they felt should be tried as war 
criminals and the Emperor was at the top of the list. 32 The Australian 
30Ibid., 204. 
3~ew York Times, February 2, 1950. 
32Japan Times, January 21, 1946, lo 
.3.3 
spokesman to the United Nations War Crimes Commission askedj'or the 
indictment of Hirohito on the grounds that he was head.<>f the Japanese 
state. 33 The other Southeast Asian countries backed Australia. Briga-
dier General Carlos P. Romulo, Resident Commissioner to the Philippine 
Islands from the United States, called for congressional action ageinst 
war criminals, including the Japanese Emperor. 34 
Such public outcries placed SCAP in a very precarious position. 
MacArthur and most of his advisors feared the indictment of Hirohito 
would incite the Japanese to revolt against SCAP supervision. But to 
allow the Emperor to remain upon the throne, would bring only stronger 
public reprisals. Possibly Hirob;j.to could have been removed by abdi-
cation in favor of the Crown Prince Akihito o As Grew had told Cordell 
Hull in 1944, "it is the institution that is important, rather than 
the individual. 1135 So strong was the eall to try the Emperor that 
,, 
Col. Alva C. Carpenter, Chief of tHe Legal Section for General MacAr-
thur, was quoted at a press conference that the Emperor was not immune 
from prosecution • .36 
Certainly the occupation officials could have found enough evidence 
to charge Hirohito with war crimeso He could have been charged with 
initiation of the war under article five of the "Charter for the 
Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East." 
The article emphasized that official position was not enough to free 
.3.3~ York Times, May 25, 1945, 8 • 
.34rbide , March 2.3, 1945, 8 • 
.35Grew, Turbulent~' 1414e 
36New York Times, October 21, 1945, 2. 
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the accused from responsibility. 37 No one was safe from indictment. 
These points were also included within "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender 
Directive to SCAP." 
The Japanese Constitutional Laws would have been used as evidence 
against the Emperor. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor de-
clared war. The Emperor was commander-in-chief of the imperial forces. 
Certainly he was aware of the war clique which anticipated hostilities 
with the western powers. Thus the responsibility for war could easily 
have been placed in his lapo 
Hirohito understood how vunerable his position was following the 
war. He was acutely aware that the Allies could easily place him on 
the list of war criminals. He had noticed that even some Japanese 
newspapers felt he should abdicate and stand trialo 38 
But this does not appear to have been- his main object of concern. 
Throughout history, Japanese in leadership positions had taken partial 
blame for the mistakes of their underlings. The Tenno did not like 
standing by untouched while those around him were being accused of 
being criminals against the world. It was for such a reason that the 
Emperor told Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that 
he was ready to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince. 39 
Many of the members of the royal family believed the Emperor 
should resigne The traditionalists, die-hards, and the totalitarians 
37Dennett and Turner, Documents~ American Foreign Relations, VIII, 
3550 
38The Minpo and the Daigaku Shimbun ran such articles. ~ York 
Times, December 10, 1945, 6; and John La Cerda, The Conqueror Comes .:!2.2, 
~ (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1946), 74. 
39Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 74. 
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approved of his stepping down. Their chief spokesman was Prince 
Naruhiko Higashikuni, the Emperor's cousin. He had favored the Emperor 
signing the documents of surrender and then abdicating to show his 
remorse for Japan's downfall. To Higashikuni, the Emperor was the 
captain who must go down with his ship.40 
While the die-hard traditionalist of old Japan acclaimed the idea 
of Hirohito resigning, parliamentarians such as Ichiro Hatoyama, Yukio 
Ozaki, Takao Saito, and Dr. Hitoshi Ashida opposed the distasteful 
thought. Ashida, who became Prime Minister under the occupation, 
tried to express his fears to SCAP and to inform MacArthur that pressure 
was building for Hirohito to abdicate so as to share responsibility for 
the war with his subordinates.41 
The Emperor was soon convinced he should step down, such was his 
desire to stand along with the so called war criminals. But the 
Japanese "liberals" pointed out to him that such a move could sabotage 
the occupation. Hirohito decided to ask MacArthur when and if he should 
resign. 
At the first meeting between Hirohito and G,neral MacArthur on 
September the twentieth, the Emperor said he was ready to place himself 
in the hands of the Allies for judgment. The Emperor claimed sole 
responsibility for every military and political decision made in 
40ibid., 74; and Leonard Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19bb), 335. 
4~illiam J. Sebald, fil:!d!. MacArthur in JaEan: A, Personal History 
2f ~ Occupation (London:, Cresset, 1967), 1 1; and Wilde:s, Typhoon 
i!l Toqo, 74,. 
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bringing war between Japan and the United States.42 He then aske~ the 
General his opinion of abdication but MacArthur dodged the issue as he 
had no authority to interfere in what was viewed as an internal Japanese 
problem. 4.3 
Ironically the general was the one who settled the question.44 
MacArthur reasoned that while he had no real authority to intervene in 
the affair, perhaps he could ease the tensions upon the Emperor. The 
general had changed his opinion of the Emperor. He had been impressed 
when Hirohito had been willing to accept all blame for the war. He 
now viewed the Emperor as a very strong but peace loving man who was 
more interested in nature than in autocracy and war. 45 
On more practical grounds, SCAP feared that if he were convicted, 
and/or hanged, civil war would be inevitable. General MacArthur ad-
vised Washington that if this resulted; he would probably need a 
million reinforcements in order to keep the peace.46 
That was all that was necessary to be said. · The American populUfi: · 
~:;,,.:'········ 
would have been overwhelmingly opposed to sending such a large 
number of men to Japan. The United States was tired of war and wanted 
peace. So on October the sixth of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
42Douglas MacArthur, Reminscences. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1964), 288. 
43wildes, Ty;phoon ~.Tokyo, 76. 
44whitney, MacArthur: His. Rendezvous with History, 28.3; and La 
Cerea, ~ Conqueror Comes .!:£ ~' 70; and McNelly, "Political Reform 
in Japan:· A SCAP Report," !!!: Eastern Survey, IXX, 1620 
45LaCerda, The. Conqueror Comes . .:!::£ ~' 70. 
4\acArthur, Reminiscences, 288; and Whitney, MacArthur: ~ 
Rendezvous ~ History, 284. 
forwarded a top-secret directive renewing the order to start the war 
crimes trials, but forbidding any action against the Emperor. 47 The 
Emperor's name was quickly stricken from the several lists of indict-
ments that had been submitted by Australia and China. Soon everyone 
but the Russians and the Japanese communists had ceased to demand 
the Emperor's trial. The Far East Commission adopted a resolution to 
discontinue the trial policy. On April the third of 1950, a F.EC 
'J7 
Directive to SCAP emphasized the Emperor should be exempt from indict-
ment as a war criminal unless a decision to the contrary was author-
ized by the F.EC. 48 
Whether there was any truth to the rumors, or in reports that 
SCAP had personally requested the Emperor to stay on the throne was 
not known. Per.haps the Emperor was unofficially infonned of the secret 
directive. At any rate, it was made public on the eighth of October 
that the Emperor would not abdicate. 49 From that time forward, the 
Allies, except for the Soviet Union, did not make attacks upon the 
Tenno. 50 
The decision not to place the Emperor on trial had settled a very 
ticklish problem. Certainly there was American apprehension at the 
outset of the occupation that the Emperor was too "hot." The removal 
of Hirohito would have only thrown Japan into turmoil. The trial would 
47 Wildes, 'l';yphoon 1:E:, Tokyo, 77 • 
48nennett · and Turner, eds., Documents of American Foreign Relations, 
XIII, (1950), 480.. - . . 
49Robert A. Fearey, ~ Occupation.~ Japan, Second Phase: 
1948-1950, 18; and Wildes, T;ypohoon !E. Tokyo, 77. 
5~ark J. Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: w. Sloane Associates, 
1948), 475. 
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have smoothed international fever, or perhaps, just kept the record 
straight. Neither of these reasons seem enough justification for such 
action. 
The Emperor had always claimed to be too sacred to become involved 
in politics. A person familiar with the workings of Japanese politics 
would have built an excellent case showing that the Emperor had little 
voice in the decision for war. The cult of militarism had been arti-
ficially developed with the establishment of the Shogunate and later 
the Meiji Restoration. The Emperor had been quite simply used as a 
convenj.ent facade. Throughout much of its history, Japan's people had 
been virtually unaware that there was such a thing as an Imperial 
Institution. In other words, the Japanese did not need their Tenno to 
be militarily aggressive, nor did the existence of the Imperial Insti-
tution make them militaristic. This essential neutralism of the 
Imperial Institution promoted the decision to retain Hirohito upon the 
throne. The door was then open for the occupation officials to continue 
the historical position of the Emperor for the facilitating of SCAP 
policy which would hopefully bring democracyiback to.Japan. 
CHAPTER III 
CHANGES IN THE lMPERIAL INSTITUTION 
So deeply embeded was the Imperial Institution into every facet 
of Japanese life that it was impossible to attempt any reform in Japan 
unless the institution was reconstructed along more democratic lineso 
Occupation officials thus deemed it necessary to place the Emperor 
under the same laws that governed the people of Japan. State Shintoism 
was to be abolished, and the laws governing the Irnperial family re-
vamped. The Japanese Education Ministers were to be encouraged to 
change the emphasis of the entire education systemo Also, it was 
decided that the Emperor should conduct public tours throughout Japan 
in order to lend prestige to the occupation policies. Hopefully, 
these trips would tend to "humanize" the Emperor, and to divorce him 
from the religious cult of State Shintoism that had s~rrounded him in 
pre-war Japan. 
The most important of all these endeavors was the revision of the 
existing Japanese Constitution. Only by re-evaluating the Emperor's 
constitutional powers could real democracy grow in post-war Japan. 
. ,;,;;:_ 
Under the Meiji· Constitution, the Emperor had supreme control over 
the army and navy, but what this actually meant was that the military 
was not responsible to the Government. The old constitution had been 
so narrowly interpreted that the Emperor was not an organ of the State 
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but the State itself .1 If democracy was to progress in po·st-war Japan, 
a new constitution had to be drafted that would design the Imperial 
Institution as an organ of the State with checks upon its power. What 
was needed was an organic law that would af:l'Sure the rights of the 
individual and still keep the essence of national unity under the 
Emperor, for the Japanese people could not conceive of a Japan without 
their Emperor. 
The policy began when "The Basic Principles for a New Japanese 
Constitution" was sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Far East 
Commission stating plainly that, "the Emperor shall be deprived of all 
military authority such as that provided in •••• the Constitution of 
1889.112 
The basic problem was how to pursuade the Japanese to accept 
the idea that Japan needed a new constitution, and it would have to 
be implemented so that there would be no doubt as to the legitimacy of 
the document. The occupation officials had to prevail upon the existing 
Japanese government, including the Emperor, to undertake its own re-
forms:.., But in theory the Emperor could not introduce nor fundamentally 
change the Constitution of 1889 as it was considered a part of the 
National Polity. 3 It was decided that the best method to implement the 
new constitution would be to attach it to the Meiji Constitution as an 
~Hugh Borton, .11.The Administ,ration and Strucj,ur.e of .Japanese 
Governments," The Department of State, ~ Eastern Series (Washington 
n.c.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 817. 
2Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 
Political Reorientation Q! Japan, September, lli2, !:2_ September, 1948 
(Washington n.c.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), II,661. 
3Ibid., II, 662. 
41 
amendment. 4 '. 
After these SCAP decisions, it was necessary to educate the 
Japanese officials to the fundamental changes SCAP wanted. Soon after 
occupation began, .Prince Fuminaro Konoye, Minister without Portfolio, 
~\. .. 
met with George Atcheson, Jr., U. s. Political adviser to the Supreme 
Commander. 5 Atcheson outlined the major points SCAP considered basic 
for constitutional revision. Several of these points were specifically 
for the curtailment of the Emperor's authority to legislate by means 
of rescript and ordinanceo General MacArthur wanted to be sure that 
the Emperor was made the symbol of state. Imperial succession had to 
be dynastic, and the duties of the Emperor had to be in accordance 
6 with a constitution that would be responsible to the peopleo 
As soon as it was learned that a revision of the constitution was 
in order, many of the several political parties began submitting their 
own versions of what should be done~ These proposals ranged from 
total abolition of the Imperial Institution to initially no change in 
the Emperor's status and prerogatives. 
The most conservative of all the proposals was the so-called 
Progressive Party'so The Emperor was to remain as the head of state 
4Ibid., II, 663. 
5Prince Konoye was related to the Imperial Family by marriage. 
He had been Premier three times, the last in 1940 just before Tojo's 
takeover. He later committed suicide upon learning that he was to be 
indicted as a war criminalo 
6scAP, Political Reorientation 2f Japan, I, 102; and T. McNelly, 
"Political Reform in Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, IXX, 
(September, 1950), 161-1640 
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with fundamentally the same powers as under the Constitution of i889.7 
The proposal of the Liberal Party was not very different. Sovereignty 
still resided with the Emperor. His prerogatives were curtailed in 
that he could act only with "the assistance of his Ministers of State" 
and he would have neither legal nor political responsibility. However, 
neither would he be answerable through legal or political process. 8 
The Social Demo.crats were able to arrive at a proposal that was 
progressive in irparts and more in line with what SCAP had in mindo 
Sovereignty was to reside with the state, which included the Emperor. 
The Diet became the supreme organ of the state by divorcing the 
Imperial Institution from politics. The Emperor, though his duties 
were purely ceremonial, appointed the Prime Minister after consultation 
with the presidents of both houses of the legislature.9 
The Communist proposal was by far the most radical. Sovereignty 
was placed in the hands of the people. The Imperial Institution was 
to be completely abolished. The comrrrunists were convinced that the 
institution represented the feudal remains of all that was hated in 
military Japan when the Japanese leaders continually exploited the 
masses for the "good" of Japan. The Emperor was the antithesis of all 
the communist endeavors for a classless society. Thus to the communist, 
only the elimination of the Emperor would assure the total democrati-
10 zation of Japan. 
7SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 95. The Emperor 
exercised legislative powers with the consent of the,Diet through 
Imperial Ordinances. He remained in control of the Army and Navy. 
8Ibid., I, 96. 
9Ibid., I, 96-97. 
lOibid., I, 96. 
To study the situation, a Constitutional Problem Investigation 
Committee under Dr. Joji Matsumoto was established by the Japanese 
. A,..,( 
Cabinet in October, 1945. But the Matsumoto Committee, as it was 
called, found it difficult to formulate a constitution that would 
please General MacArthur. The draft of the committee did not sub-
stantially change the powers of the Emperor but only reworded the 
Meiji Constitution.11 The Emperor was to be supreme and inviolable 
rather than sacred and inviolablee Articles four, five, six, nine, 
ten, fourteen, sixteen, seventeen, of the old constitution remained 
12 unchanged., Article fifteen which dealt with confering titles of 
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nobility was reworded to "confering marks of honor only. 1113 In other 
words, the constitutional status of the Emperor under the Ma\sumoto 
Draft remained the same as under the Meiji Constitution except that hi~ 
divinity was left out. The decision of the constitutional committee 
was reported to SCAP under reports entitled, "Gist of .. the Revision 
of the Constitution, 1114 and "A General Explanation of the Constitu-
tional Revision by the Government. 1115 
SCAP refused to approve the rpports .. Three times the committee 
submitted constitutional drafts to General MacArthur and three times 
SCAP rejected the proposals. Finally in answer to the Matsumoto 
Drafts, the Government Section of SCAP issued its own constitutional 
11For a c0py of the Meiji Constitution, see Ibide, II, 586. 
12:rbid., II, 6"J:.7. 




15IbidG, II, 619. 
"outline, in order to give the Japanese an idea of what SCAP wanted 
• th t"t t" 16 lll e new cons i u ion." 
Under Article One the Emperor was the symbol of the state. 
Acts of state had to have the approval of the Diet and the Cabinet. 
The Emperor could appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court and 
the Prime Minister, but only with the designation of the cabinet. 
The Emperor could convene the Diet, dissolve the House of Representa-
tives, proclaim general elections, receive foreign ambassadors and 
ministers, and perform ceremonial functions. The Imperial Throne was 
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to be dynastic and succession was to be in accordance with the Imperial 
House Law passed by the Diet. There was no mention of the Emperor 
being sacred. In fact, Article I left the door open for the abolition 
of the Imperial system if the sovereign will of the Japanese people 
asked for a constitutional amendment.17 
The ''MacArthur Constitution" struck many Japanese liberals with 
consternation because it not only proclaimed the alien idea of,popular 
sovereignty, but it cast doubt upon the national polity which the 
liberals had always argued would be strengthened by liberalization of 
· . 18 the organic law. Thus, democracy in Japan had always been founded 
upon the Imperial System and liberalization of the Constitution would 
indicate the benevolence of the Japanese Emperors. The people would 
16Ibid., +, ill. 
l7Ryusuke Suda, "Role of the Emperor in Post-War Japan," Social 
~ Economic Aspects~ Japan, 1917-1967 Naosaku Uchida and Kotaro 
Ikeda, eds. (Tokyo: Economic Institute of Seijo University, 1967), 223. 
18Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirsi, ~ Story of Jap6 ~ Crisis, Trans. Kenichi Yoshida (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19 2) 139; 
and Kazuo Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitu-
tion," American Political Science Review, XLIX, (Septemb~r, 1955), 
671 •. · . . . . . . . · 
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love their Emperor more than ever. Democracy, they argued was a 
part of the history of Japan originating in the promises of the Emperor 
Meiji. Also it was imposed by a military government and the liberals 
had always fought rule by the military. There was no difference in 
pressure exerted by the allied military authorities and that by the 
old Japanese military officials. 
The committee loitered to such an extent that SCAP was forced to 
inform them that there was no compulsion upon them to draft anyi more 
constitutions as General MacArthur was prepared to lay the SCAP draft 
before the people.19 In desperation, Prime Minister Shidehara, ac-
companied by Yoshida and Narahashi visited the Emperor on February 22, 
1946, and advised him of the changes of his powers under the "MacArthur 
Draft." Hirohito told the delegation that he fully supported the most 
thorough revision of the old constitution, even to the point of com-
pletely depriving the Emperor of all political authority. 20 
There appear to have been two reasons why the Emperor was in 
favor of the reforms. He was basically a liberal in political philo-
sophy. He had been so since his tour of Europe during the 19~'s 
when constitutional democracy was in vogue in his country. The smooth 
functioning workings of the European democracies had impressed hil!l, 
and he had looked on in favor at his own people's attempts at democ-
racy. He had looked on with trepidation as the power of the military 
l9G. B. Sanso:ro, "The Political Orientation of Japan," Pacific 
Affairs, XXIV, (September, 1951), 308. 
20scAP, Politi~al Reorientation of Japan, I, 106; and Douglas 
MacArthur, Reminscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 
300; and McNelly, "Political Reform of Japan: A SCAP Report,"~ 
Eastern Survey, IXX, 163. 
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grew in the thirties thwarting the attempts at parliamentary government. 
The se~ond reason gives an insight to his personality. Hirohito 
was not a politically minded person. His main field of interest was 
biology. He did not want to be burdened with the heavy reins of power 
but was content to serve as the symbol of the state and not the State 
itself. 
The drafted constitution was publicly announced at the "command 
of the Emperor" and with the "full approval" of General MacArthur on 
March 6, 1946. 21 This, however, did not mean that the constitution 
was automatically accepted. Strong debates were held in the legis-
lature during the spring, summer, and on ,1into the fall. These argu-
ments centered around the preservation of the national polity and the 
prerogatives of the Imperial Institution. But it is important to note 
that the questions related to the nature and intent of the document, 
not to specific articles. Opponents of the constitution said that 
the Emperor was prcrc~~lyvulnerable because the constitution was 
inconsistent with the claim that the national polity had been pre-
served. The new constitution placed sovereignty with the people. 
This, the opponents charged, was alien to Japan. What was needed was 
the corporate state with the philosophy of the "organ theory" where 
the Emperor as a separate branch of the government held a certain 
governmental power in order to check the other branches of govern-
ment.22 At a House Constitutional Committee hearing, Tokujiro 
21scAP, Political Reorientation 2f Japan, II, 657. 
22Ibid., I, lll; and Kazuo Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in 
the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Review, XLIX, 670. 
Kanamori testified that the word "people" in the preamble and in 
Articles I and CII seemed to exclude the Emperor from authority. 23 
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The government ministers supported the constitution by asserting 
that the constitution did not change the national polity, but in 
fact, preserved it. S~ch men as Reijiro'. Wakatsku,e., former Prime 
Minister, Admiral Keisuke Okada 1 also a former Prime Minister, argued 
that they still believed in kokutai and that they would not be in 
favor of any document that would not insure its continuance. 24 Prime 
Minister Shidehara was in favor of a constitutional mon~rchy. 25 
Influential political scholars such as Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, 
the constitutional scholar and author of the "Emperor-Organ" theory, 
stated his belief in the Tenno system and his certainty that the 
institution was compatible with the new constitution draft. 26 Dr. 
Ruchiro Hoashi later pointed out in an article that the Imperial 
system would serve as a foundation for Japanese democracy. 27 
These testimonials pl:u.e the influence and pre5su.re of SCAP 
.. ,-.. \ 
"• 
persuaded the Japanese officials to approve the constitution. The 
House endorsed the revisions on October 29, and submitted them to the 
Privy Council. With the Emperor attending the meeting, the Privy 
23Japan Times, July 4, 1946, 1. 
2~obutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,, 
1957), 47. Kokutai is the word used to depict the concept of the 
Emperor as a father who oversees the Japanese Family State. This 
also had a religious conatation during the existence of State 
Shintoism. 
25cfapan Times, January 25, 1946, 3$ 
26rbid., January 30, 1946, 1. 
27Ibid., March 7, 1946, 4. 
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Council approved the new constitution. 28 November third was the 
promulgation date highlighted by an Imperial Rescript before the 
Diet. 29 The Constitution went into effect six months later on May 3, 
1947. 
The Constitution of 1947 did not change the political position of 
the Emperor because the Japanese Emperor had not actually ruled in a 
thousand years. What change there was had been theoretical. The 
Japanese must have realized this because an editorial in the Japan 
Times on the birthday of the Emperor lauded the fact that while other 
Japanese institutions were being disgarded or revised, the Imperial 
Institution remained to lead the people into the post-war era.30 The 
Prime Minister still tendered resignations to the throne so that the 
Emperor could call for a new election.31 The new constitution was an 
attempted compromise. It was written largely in SCAP headquarters, 
with the idea of perpetuating the stabilizing influence of the 
throne.32 The Emperor's power to dissolve the Diet came under protest 
but in 1953, the Supreme Court dismissed the case.33 
Constitutional revision opened the door for more democratic 
reforms. SCAP could then turn its attention to restructuring or 
28scAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 111. 
29Ibid., II, 670. It is significant that the Emperor wore morning 
clothes instead of his traditional military uniform when he went before 
the Diet with the Constitution, 
30Japan Times, April 29, 1946, 4. 
31aussell Brimes, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippin-
cott Co., 1948), 85. 
32Ibid. 
33John M. Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme 
Court Decisions, 1948=1%o""""'(seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1964), 366. · 
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abolishing certain laws that placed the Imperial Institution above 
the normal legal processes and thus put the Emperor on the same legal 
footing as the common Japanese mano 
One of those laws which needed re-examination was the old 
criminal code of 1907. It was considered undemocratic because of 
the 1fse majeste"; defined as any criminal act against the Imperial 
family. Any act of violence against the Mikado or any dissenting 
voice against the Imperial Institution was treated as an overt act of 
treason against the state as the Emperor was the foundation for the 
national polity. 
While the legal section of SCAP was determined to abolish this 
law and to replace it with a code that was more compatible with the 
new constitution, the Japanese officials under the occupation were 
determined to keep the statute on the books. In a letter to General 
MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida pointed out that the Emperor 
held too important a position to be placed under the same laws that 
govern the people of.Japane34 In answer to Yoshida's letter, General 
MacArthur wrot~ "as the symbol of state and of unity of the people, 
the Emperor is entitled to no more legal protection nor no less than 
that accorded to all other citizenSoeee 1135 
Resigned to carrying out the terms of the occupation policies, the 
Diet passed into law the Partial Amendment to the Criminal Code of 
1907e Known as the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1948, it struck out 
articles seventy-three and seventy-six of the old code which regulated 
34scAP, Political Reorientation .2f Japan, II, 679. 
35Ibido, II, 680e 
the offenses against the Imperial Household, thus abolishing 1fse 
majestef. 36 
The Japanese immediately put the new law to use. Five men were 
released in Tokyo from charges of publicly critic:izingthe Emperor.37 
The precedent was set when the Supreme Court overruled a decision of 
a lower court which had sentenced a young man to eight months in 
prison for writing a placard depicting an Imperial Rescript which was 
derogatory toward the Emperor. The defense won the case on grounds 
that the defendant could not be tried for 1/se majestt: nor could he 
be held for libel as the injured party, which was of course the 
Emperor, had not complainedo3B 
Having erased the constitut~onal powers of the Emperor and 
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abolishing the special laws that had placed the Emperor above the law, 
the occupation officials turned to another revision of the Imperial 
system, the transfer of the vast wealth of the Emperor to the State. 
It was one of the top priorities of the occupation. The "U.S. Initial 
P9st-Surrender Policy for Japan" stipulated that the Imperial House-
hold property must not stand in the way of occupation objectives.39 
SCAP was to stop any revenue of the Imperial family. 40 A complete 
.36Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, ed., Law E! Japan: ~ Legal Order in 
~ Changi~ Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 19 3), l7o . 
37MacArthur, Reminiscences, 317. 
38Japan Times, November 4, 1946, 1. 
39scAPv J:.olitical Reorientation_gf Japan, II, 426; and Raymond 
Dennett and Robert Turner, eds., Documents of American Foreign Rela-
tion, VIII · (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 273. 
40SCAP, Pol.itical Reorientation.£! Japan, II, 438. 
inventory of all Imperial Household assets was made and submitted to 
SCAP valuing the Imperial property holdings at 1,700,ooo,ooo·yen41 
which was somewhere between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000. The 
fortune was nourished by an annual salary of $1,600,000 tax free. 
Imperial landholdings covered six thousand square miles. The Empe,:ror 
held thousands of blue-chip stocks, especially in banking equities 
51 
and he was the largest investor in N.Y.K. shipping, run by Mitsubishi, 
and in O.S.K. ship lines N.Y.K. 's bitigest competitor. 42 
Diverting these holdings and revenue from the Emperor to the 
State required the revision of the old constitution and the Imperial 
House Economy Law. Under the first chapter of the new Japanese 
Constitution of 1947, the Emperor was prohibited from either giving 
or receiving property and gifts without the authorization of the Diet~3 
During the occupation, SCAP authorization was also needed. Article 
eighty eight under chapter seven transferred all property of the 
Imperial Household to the State. Any salary received by the Emperor 
was determined by the Diet.44 
The Imperial House Economy Law was designed to carry out the 
constitutional changes. The law established an Imperial House Econo-
mic Council to advise the Emperor of the provisions of the new law 
and to see that they were complied with. Imperial expenses were to be 
~ark J. Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: W. Sloane Association, 
1948), 146. 
42Ibid., 147; and Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The 
Secret Stru~~e ~Ended!!: Empire {New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 19 , 91. 
43scAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 671. 
44rbid., II, 676; and Russell Brimes, MacArtnur's Japan (Phila-
Delphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 86. 
paid 9ut of the annual national budget. An Office of the Imperial 
Household was created to manage the property of the family. 45 Under 
the Imperial Household Law, property of the household was limited to 
the Emperoris own hereditary estates. 
In 1947, a Property Tax based upon a graduated basis was passed 
by the Diet. This law was not specifically for the Emperor but under 
the new governing principles, he was not exempt as he might have once 
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been. As a result, he had to pay a ninety per cent levy tax which to-
taledalmost 3,000,000,000 yen as the entire family holdings were 
assessed at over 3,000,000,000 yen. He still retained over 300,000,000 
yen bringing his personal fortune to more than twice that of the 
wealthiest zaibatsu.46 As an "economy move" the Emperor dismissed 
over seventy-five per cent of the 8,000 Palace employees, the Palace 
guards being the first to go.47 
Laws to reform the Imperial family next commanded the attention 
of the occupation. To insure SCAP's wishes, the court officials took 
the initiative by abolishing the influential office of Lord Keeper 
of the Privy Seal. 48 The Diet in 1947 inaugurated the new Imperial 
45scAP, Political Reorientation of Capan, II, 850; and Edwin M. 
Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1948), 68. ~ 
46 J £an Times, February 19, 194 7, 3; and Brimes, MacArthur's 
Japan, • 
47Japan Times, January 5, 1947, l; and Harry Wildes, Typhoon 2:!!-
~: The Occupation~ Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan Co., 
I9)4J, 83. 
4~arquis Kido, the last Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was later 
sentenced to life imprisonment by the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East and Admiral Kanito):X),.~ll&me·ri;:i Grand Chamberlin was 
forced to resign under the pressure of the SCAP purge directives. 
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House Agency Law which established the Imperial House Agency that 
assumed the functions of the abolished Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 
and the Imperial Household Ministry. The agency was composed of the 
Grand Steward, the Vice-Grand Steward, the Private Secretary of the 
Grand Steward, the Grand Chamberlain, Chamberlains, the Master of 
Ceremonies, and the Secretary of the Imperial House Agency. The agency 
was in charge of all state affairs and the Emperor's acts were provided 
for ~Y. government ordinanceo 49 The law also reduced the Imperial Family to 
the Empress, the Grand Empress, Imperial Princes, the consorts of the 
Imperial Princes, the Imperial Princesses, and the grandchildren of 
the Emperor. SCAP further reduced the ranks of the nobility through 
the Imperial Household Law and the Imperial Ordinance No. I, which 
purged "undesirables from public servicee50 By spring of 1946, fifteen 
Princes had resigned from the House of Peers under the purge direc-
tive, 51 and by Christmas, 1946, the ranks of the nobility we re reduced 
by fifty-one per cent. Those reduced in rank received compensation 
ranging from one hundred million yen to eight hundred million yen, 
but after paying the ninety per cent capital levy tax, the compensation 
was negligibleo 
The second of the laws governing the Imperial Family was the 
Imperial House Law which covered all matters concerning succession, 
membership of the Imperial Family, establishment of the regency, 
49Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 62e 
50SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 501-504; and Japan 
Times 9 May 28, 1946, 2~ 
51wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 81-82. 
ceremonial functions, funerals, records of Imperial lineage, and the 
Imperial House Council which took the place of the Imperial Family 
Councilo 52 The Council was composed of ten members, two from the 
Imperial Family, the President and Vice-President of the House of 
R~presentatives and the House of Councilors, the Prime Minister, who 
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served as the presiding officer, the head of the Imperial House Agency, 
the Chief Judge, and one other judge of the Supreme Court. 53 
Succession to the throne was set by the Imperial House Law. The 
primary heir to the throne was the Crown Prince, followed in order of 
succession by the Emperor's eldest grandson, other descendants of the 
eldest son of the Emperor, the second son of the Emperor and his 
descendants, other descendants of the Emperor, brothers of the Emperor, 
descendants of the brothers of the Emperor, uncles of the Emperor and 
their descendants. There was no provision for abdicationa In case of 
necessity, a Regent would serve until the Emperor became of age at 
eighteen. 54 
The occupation officials knew that it would take more than the 
changing of laws to remove the Emperor from the center of Japanese 
powera That is why in late 1945 the Allies began a policy to "humanize" 
Hirohitoo The basic idea was to get statutes on the books that would 
annihilate Shintoism as a state religion. The best method to destroy 
Shintoism was by revamping the educational system and by employing a 
52u. So Department of the Armya Civil Affairs Division, Summation 
o.f ~-Military Activities 2£! Japan, ·September, 1947 .!:£ August, 1948 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 20a 
53McNelly, Contemporary Government .£f. Japan, 61. 
54SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 846-848; and McNelly, 
Contemporary Government of Japan, 61:-
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program that would hopefully remove the aura surrounding the Emperor. 
Also the decision was made to induce the Emperor to appear before the 
public as often as possible. It was hoped that public exposure would 
wash away much of the mysticism that had grown around the Emperor during 
the late eighteen hundreds. 
As the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, the Emper-
or was the High Priest of Japan and thus considered a god, but in a 
different way than the West could comprehend. !n Japan all men were 
potential deities .. The famous suicide pilots of the Second World War 
were called "Kamikaze" because a Kamikaze \'{as a type of god, and if 
these pilots would happen to die for their Emperor, the Japanese 
believed they would become gods. The greater the man, the better his 
chances of being a god. The Emperor was considered the greatest man 
in Japan, thus the greater potential to become a great god. 55 As 
Admiral Okada once said, "he (Emperor) is a god whom the people worship 
without question. 1156 
If the Japanese people believed this to be true, evidently the 
Emperor did not. On New Years day in 1946, SCAP policy received an 
I 
accommodation when the Emperor proclaimed his non-divinity rescript. 
"The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust 
and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They 
are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is 
55Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in! Changing World: 
Observations on the Use of the Social Sciences (New York: E. P. 
Dutton and Co7; Inc.-;-I949)~2. 
56Ike, Japanese Politics, 48. 
divine. 11 57 
Some sources claim that it was SOAP pressure that brought the 
rescript and that it could have been written at SCAP headquarters.58 
56 
Occupation officials claim the rescript resulted from Hirohito's initi-
ative, not from SOAP. 59 Whether the Emperor decided to announce the 
rescript out of personal belief or because of SOAP insistence is not 
known. But neither is it particularly important. What is important 
is that the declaration psychologically prepared the Japanese people 
for the religious and educational reforms to come. Some months later, 
the Japan Times printed an historical explanation of the reason for 
the rescript. The word "kami" had originally referred to a leader of 
ancient tribes or families, not the name for a god. Tr\us, in ancient 
60 Japan the Emperor was not a god but a powerful leader. 
While the Imperial Rescript helped clear the way for freedom of 
religion, the Allied authorities intended not only to establish re-
ligious freedom but freedom from religion---State Shintoism. This 
goal took root in the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" 
and in Education in the~ Japan, written by the U.S. Department of 
the Army .. 
SOAP initiated its program by sending a memorandum to the Imperial 
57SCAPp Political Reorientation£! Japan, II, 470. 
58John M .. Maki, Government~ Politics in Jjpa66 ~~to Democracy (New York: Frederick A .. Praeger, 1962, ; and Leonard 
O. Mosley, Hirohito, Em~eror £! Japan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc .. , 19 6) , 34 7 e 
59MacArthur, Reminiscences, 311; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: 
His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 275. 
60Japan Times, May 16, 1946, 4 .. 
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Japanese Government in December of 1945 ordering the end of Shintoism~1 
SCAP followed up its own order by disbanding the Jikosama religious cult 
which strongly preached Emperor worship. 
A positive education reform mission was established under Dr. 
George D. Stoddard. Dr. Stoddard, after a careful study of the situa-
tion, recommended to the Japanese Ministry of Education that the text-
books teaching "morals" (Shushin) be disposed of and a plan for re-
vision of education be submitted to SCAP for approval.62 "Morals," 
the mission recommended, "which in Japanese education has fostered sub-
'63 missiveness. ~ •• should be differently constructed." 
Eager to cooperate with SCAP, the Japanese government immediately 
began following Dr. Stoddard's recommendations. A new education law 
passed the Diet in 1947. The government prohibj_ted the teaching of 
any type of religion in the public schools. 64 
The entire social sciences were almost totally revamped. Not 
only religious but also ultranationalisti~ militaristic, and 
ethocentric materials were not to be used in the instruction of 
61u. S. Department of the Army. Civil Affairs Division, 
Education in the~ Japan (Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers Civil Information and Education 
Section, 1948), II, 26. 
62 u. S. War Department, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers, SCAP Directives to the Imperial Japanese 
Government, 1945-1946 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1946), VI, 51. 
63u. S. Department of the Army, Education in the~ Japan, II, 51. 
64Toid., 178. 
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students.65 The Ministry of Education issued numerous instructions to 
the Prefectural Governors and Directors of various schools ordering 
the school officials to refrain from considering the Imperial Rescripts 
as the sole source of educational philosophy. The Imperial portraits 
were not to be hung in the schools nor observed as sacred. 
The program was very successful. Progress was so rapid that by 
the end of 1946, SCAP had approved the national education program and 
had delivered the new textbooks. 66 The new social studies texts empha-
sized such social principles as worth of the individual, equality 
before the law, and other democratic lessons. Thus school sponsored 
veneration of the Emperor was eliminated.67 
In 1951, the Ministry of Education came under harsh public criti-
cism when it published 11An Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese 
People.," The document emphasized the new "democratic" Emperor as no 
longer the center of power nor an object of worship, but the object 
of affection .. 68 However the ministry stood by the document by declaring 
65Ibid .. 7 II, 109; and General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers. Civil Information and Education Section. Edu-
cation Divison, Post-War Developments.!!! Japanese Education, 1945-1952 
(Tokyo: April, 1952), II, 128 .. 
66courses in geography were r~opened in June, 1946, and history 
classes were opened in October, of ,the same·year. U.S. Department 
of the Army, Education,!!:! the New Japan, II, 46-47· 
67General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, Post-War Developments.!!! Japanese Education, I, 27; and U. s. 
War Department, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Two Years .£f 
Occupation; Social (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 
3; and General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. Mission~ Accom-
iishments .£f ~ Occupation in the Civil Information and Education 
Fields Tokyo: 1950), 16. 
68 R .. P .. Dore, "The Ethics of New Japan," Pacific Affairs, vol. 25, 
(June, 1952), 27 .. 
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it in accordance with the political trends of the times. 
The Japanese generally accepted the new education reforms. There 
was no outcry for the reinstatement of Shushin within the school 
curriculum nor against the abolition of State Shinto. The Emperor 
continued to visit such important Shrines as the Ise Shrine, though in 
theory the visits were now only as a private citizen not as an reli-
gious official. But his spiritual influence continued to be exten-
. 69 s1ve. 
Perhaps SCAP looked with disdain upon the continuing influence 
of the Emperor, for early in 1946 the campaign began to change the 
public image of the Emperor. The Emperor was to begin making numerous 
trips throughout the nation. Supposedly the decision was made at the 
highest levels of the Japanese Government. Assuredly SCAP approved 
of the idea. The more familiar the people became with their Emperor, 
the less reverent they would be toward him. The trips were handled 
carefully and were closely planned. Often buildings were built or 
repaired so the Emperor would receive a better impression. The Emperor 
was cited as a man desiring to get out among his people. 70 The Emperor 
visited hospitals, planted rice in Takasaki Prefecture, amr~ffli!ipected 
schools and relief housing. 
The Japan Times cooperated with the new program. The Japan Times 
Magazine ran three pictorial articles depicting the Emperor as a family 
man,71 showed him working at his hobby of biological research, 72 and 
69Gayn, Japan Diary, 27 • 
70Japan Times, March 7, 1946, 2. 
7libid., January 1, 1946, 2. 
72Ibid., September 28, 1946, 2. 
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as the concerned public official exhorting the Japanese people to bear 
the lack of food, which was very scarce during the first years of the 
occupation.73 Later he gave an interview in which he expressed worry 
over the life of "vice" into which ex-servicemen had fallen.74 Thus, 
he used his waning prestige to keep lawlessness to a minimum. Hirohito 
the man began to replace Hirohito the gode 
Some of the Allies, especially the Russians, and even a few 
American observers, were disenchanted with the humanization policy, 
The Russians proclaimed it to be a capitalist plot to force Emperor 
rule upon the people.75 A few American news correspondents such as 
Mark Gayn also voiced disproval, believing that the idea was self-
defeating. "Japan has been given free speech - with reservations. 
If originally we meant to suppress militarists propaganda alone, now 
we permit no word critical of the Emperor.1176 
The humanization program had both its good and bad results. The 
Emperor was almost "paraded" before his people to show his human in-
eptitudes--shyness and lack.of articulation. Mark Gayn described a 
trip taken by the Emperor to the Takasaki Military Hospital: 
As the Emperor walked into the first ward, someone barked 
a command, and the men bowed •••• The voice barked another 
command, and the patients raised their heads, staring 
forward. At first, he shuffled past the men, stopping 
occasionally to read the charts. Then he apparently 
decided the moment called for a few words. He tried 
several questions, but they all seemed out of place. 
73Ibid., May 25, 1946, 1. 
74Ibid., January 1, 1946, 2. 
75wild€fi~ Typhoon~ Tokyo, 84. 
76Gayn, Japan Diary, 475. 
At last he settled on the simple 'Where are you from'. 
He now walked from man to man, asked his question~ and when 
the patient answered, the Emperor said, "ah, so! 11f7 
Because of his standard remark of "ah, so," many people began to 
call his "As-so San. 11 78 Once, while visiting a coal mine, a miner 
walked up and asked the Emperor to shake hands with him, something 
unheard of prior to the occupation.79 
But these incidents were not the standard reception accorded the 
61 
Emperor~ The Japanese seem to feel that he had deliberately humiliated 
himself in order to save his peopleo During the trip to Takasaki, 
Mark Gayn reports,"••••• pandemonium broke. The mob surged down from 
the rubble. I have seen mob hysteria before, but never so sudden or 
so marked .. 1180 ·A public opinion poll taken by the Japan Times during 
December, 1945, and January, 1946, indicated that nine~y-two per cent 
... 
of the people, out of over two thousand polled, backed the Emperor 
and what he was doing during the occupation. 81 
Conversely, the Communist Party which persistently attacked the 
Emperor declined in popularity. In the national elections of April, 
1946, all political parties except the Communist strongly supported the 
Emperor. As a result the Communist won only five seats in the Diet. 82 
The changes in the Imperial Institution which divorced it from 
the dogmas of militarism, politics, and religion were great break-
??Ibide, 137-1J8. 
78Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 85. 
79Ibida 1 86. 
80aayn, Japan Diary, 140. 
81Japan Times, January 24, 1946 7 lo 
82Ibido, April 14, 1946, lo 
throughs for democracy in Japan. The Constitution assured that the 
Emperor would not be involved in post-war politics. No longer could 
he be used as a facade for dictorial powers sought by an individual 
62 
or a group. The strongest organ of the national government was the 
Diet which was answerable, not to the Emperor, but to the people. The 
humanization policy fostered the transition from a state religion to a 
separation of church and state. But the popularity of the Emperor was 
not diminished and he continued to be a useful vehicle for SCAP imposed 
democracy. 
CHA.PTER IV 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATION POLICY TOWARD THE EMPEROR 
AND HIS ROLE IN POST-WAR JAPAN 
Policies of the Allied Occupation made democracy a reality in 
post-war Japan. Never had a country been so politically and socially 
changed as Japan was during its occupation. Certainly the parlia-
mentary experiment by the Japanese during the 1920's was a good 
orientation experience for the Japanese, for it gave SCAP and the 
Japanese officials guide lines to follow. But the Allied decision to 
retain the Japanese Imperial Institution and to use it as a legitima-
tizer for its policies was possibly the difference between success and 
failure. 
Democracy, of course, could not become a reality unless the peoplei 
had willed it, no matter how good the occupation policies had been nor 
how many laws were put in the statute books. While the Emperor had 
always remained above politics, his dignified acceptance of the sur-
render and his unfeigned friendliness toward the Americans and his ob-
vious approval of many of the reforms had a profound influence upon 
the Japanese people. Stripped of his mystical aura, Hirohito appeared 
as a man determined to bring peace to the world and democracy to his 
country. While those around him were being tried and convicted as war 
criminals against the world, he retained his bearing and maintained the 
affection of his people and won the respect of the Allied offici!ls. 
63 
64 
The Emperor adjusted well to his new position as a powerless symbol of 
state nor did the people seen inclined to reinstate him to his former 
"t" 1 posi ion. 
Many occupation officials asserted that there was no more SUGGe~s-
ful aspect of the occupation than the Emperor policy, and Hirohito's 
personal views contributed to this success. General MacArthur was 
quoted as saying, "the Emperor has a more thorough grasp of the demo-
crat,ic concept than almost any Japanese with whom I have talked. 112 Even 
former Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who had voiced reserva-
tions toward keeping the Emperor, said, "some of it (the Allied success), 
I believe, comes from our decision to continue the institution of the 
Emperor. 113 
The decision to retain the Emperor was one of expediency rather 
than one based on ideology. One does not find Allied advisors pro-
posing that Japan needed its Imperial Institution to survive. The 
basic point of contention was that he would be retained to effect a 
Japanese surrender. 
Following surrender, SCAP policies deliberately kept the door open 
to abolition of the institution if the Japanese people wished it. All 
policy appeared to break down the social stratification of pre-war 
Japan, but only to a certain extent. Certainly if the Imperial Family 
1william J • Sebald, ~ MacArthur in J6pan: ! Personal History .2£ the Occupation (London: Cresset, 1967), 9; and Robert Fearey, The 
Occupation .2£ Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950 (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1950), 49. 
2courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous~ History (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 286. 
3James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947), 204. 
had been eliminated, this would have destroyed the upper class. But 
the Allies did not wish to revolutionize Japan completely. 
Nor was SOAP particularly interested in the well-being of the 
Tenno. The Emperor could have easily been tried as a war criminal. 
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He was not because SOAP feared a national uprising if he were indicted. 
Instead, SOAP followed the age old practice of removing the "bad" ad-
visors of the Emperor but kept him to legitimize assumed power. 
To assure that this tactic was never used again, the occupation 
officials helped the Japanese write a new constitution that removed 
the Emperor from any seat of power and placed the power with the 
people. Japanese democracy was constructed in the form of a consti-
tutional monarchy that would hopefully assure lasting peace in Japan. 
The Imperial House Law was changed so that members of the Diet would 
have control of the affairs of the Imperial Family. The Emperor's 
role in the religious affairs of Japan was changed so that he was no 
longer considered sacred. The end of Shintoism was the result of the 
revamping of the educational system by removing the role of the Imperial 
Rescript. These changes coupled with the public tours changed his 
image from a reverent symbol to a man with human strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Certainly his physical appearance was not one of an all powerful 
god~ He was a short man about five feet six inches tall with round 
shoulders and short legs. His head appeared slightly oversized in 
relation to his body. He had a pronounced facial tic, and his right 
shoulder twitched constantly. He appeared to be poorly coordinated 
for when he walked he threw his right leg a little sideways as if he 
had no control over it~ His face was oval, covered with moles--... a 
66 
Japanese good luck omen. He had weak eyes which the war had etched with 
lines and there were hints of gray in his wide mustache. 4 
Both he and the Empress were blatantly middle-class in their 
appearance, attitudes, and actions. Often the Emperor's clothes looked 
unkempt and often looked too large for his frame. They were a couple 
dedicated to tea parties, gardening, and watercolor painting. They 
dressed conservatively, devoid of any hint of grandeur. Both were so 
common in bearing that the foreign press corps in Tokyo during the 
thirties called them "Charlie and Emma. 115 One would never guess them 
to be one of the richest couples in the world. 
Hirohito's great interest was marine biology. He had a small lab 
built on the palace ground and in the thirties, published a work, 
Opisthobranchia .2f. the Sagami Bay Region which won respect for him 
inside the international scientific community.6 
But if Hirohito did not appear to fit the role of a leader, he 
served as a useful stabilizer against possible radical change in Japan. 
Popular sovereignty was inconsistent with the traditions of Japan. 
Even during the 1920's parliamentary democracy was too unstable to last. 
Conservatives seem unanimous in agreement that the Emperor must not 
~ark Je Gayn7 Japan Diary, 137; Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's 
Surrender: The Secret Strug~le That Ended~ Empire (New York: 
MaGraw-Hill Book Company, 19 8), 90; and Russell Brimes, MacArthur's 
Japan (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 83. 
5Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, 89. 
6Elizabeth Gray Vining, Windows for the Crown Prince (New York: 
J.B. Lippincott Cos, 1952), 129; Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 
28; and Brooks, Behind Japanvs Surrender, 92. 
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be the symbol of state but its leader as head of state. 7 Leftest 
campaigned against the retention of the Emperor knowing full-well that 
if he remained they had little chance to gain power. 8 Though the 
Emperor had no particular party affiliation, he certainly wanted a 
party in power that would carry through the Allied reforms. Beyond 
that point, he seemed to care little for politics. He once expressed 
his hope to Shidehara that all thirty-six million Japanese would vote 
in the April, 1946 national elections; but he did not himself register 
to vote. 
All the political parties stood in favor of the Emperor, except 
of course the Communist. As a result, communist candidates were 
attacked and beaten. 9 The communist cry to abolish the Emperor became 
less ardent in the years to come. Still, in 1950, a public opinion 
poll of the Tokyo metropolitan area found fifty-one per cent of some 
790 people favored outlawing the Communist Party.10 
The new position of the Imperial Family contributed to an accept-
ance of constitutional monarchy and yet retained their popularity, 
though significantly different from the pre-war mania. Wherever- the 
7John M. Maki, Government and Politics in J)pan: The Road to 
Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, 204;~d Theodore 
McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Coo, 1963), 66. ~ 
8An interview with Kyuichi Takuda, Secretary-general of the 
Japanese Communist Party. Japan Times, January 1, 1946, 2. 
9Ibid., March 15, 1946, 3. 
lOAllan B9 Cole and Naomichi Nakanishi, eds., Japanese Opinion 
Polls With Socio-Political Significance, 1946-1957 (The Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University and the Roper Public 
Opinion Poll Research Center, Williams College, 1962), II, 288. 
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Emperor went, unrestrainable public demonstrations resulted. At Waka-
yama, the people tore the fenders from his car. At a northern railroad 
station a rickety overpass collapsed under the weight of thousands who 
wanted to see him.11 The strongest support for the Emperor tended to 
come from farmers, fishermen, the less educated portion of the popula-
tion, and the ol~er generationo The least enthusiastic support, and 
in some cases intense opposition, was found among the intellectuals, 
industrial workers, and the youth. But opposition tended to be based 
on political ideology rather than personal,. that is, against the system 
but not Hirohito.12 
Slowly changes in the institution became accepted, even expected. 
When the Emperor opened the Diet in 1948, it was significant that 
three once-important restrictions were broken: 1) commoners looked 
down on him from the gallery; 2) Komakichi Matsuoka, a labor leader, 
turned his back to the tenno and spoke first; 3) Juchiro Matsumoto, 
Vice President of the House of Councillors refused to attend the 
customary audience given the Diet officials after the inaugural 
ceremon:y~13 When the Imperial Family was reduced in size, a survey 
of the people by the Japan Times found that the people sympathized 
with the members who had been cast out.14 In March, 1947, the Japan 
1~rimes, MacArthur's Japan, 91 .. 
J.2Cole and Naomichi, eds., Ja anese Opinion Polls, II, 442; 
and Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1957), 48; and Huth H. Smythe and Watanobe Masahara, "Japanese Popular 
Attitudes Toward the Emperor," Pacific Affairs, XXVI, (December, 1953), 
338. 
l3Brimes, MacArthur's Japan, 96. 
14Japan Times, May 11, 1946, 3. 
Times ran an article chastising the court officials for preventing 
Crown Prince Akihito from walking among the "common people."15 
Thus, the Japanese people came to accept the new post-war role of 
the Imperial Institution. As the fraternal figure of the nation 
family, the Emperor helped Japan recover from the devastating defeat 
in World War II and the ordeal of the Allied occupation, into a new 
era of political maturity and economic prosperity. 
l5Ibid., March 28, 1947, 3· 
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